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Abstract: Purpose: The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of corporate governance on the financial performance of financial 
institutions in London city with emphasis on board role and composition, transparency and disclosure, audit and compliance and the risk 
management as indicators of corporate governance and profitability, liquidity and loan portfolio taken as proxies for financial performance.  
Design/methodology/approach: A sample of 20 financial institutions was selected and from each selected, 10 respondents were selected giving 
a total sample size of 200. The Principal Component Analysis (PCA), with inbuilt ability to check for composite reliability, was used to obtain 
composite indices for governance indicators as well as the indicators of financial performance, based on the set of questions framed for each of 
them. Findings: The results revealed that all indicators of corporate governance positively influence the financial performance of financial 
institutions. However, whereas the effect of auditing and compliance, transparency, disclosure and risk management were found to be significant 
in their influence on financial performance, board role and composition turns out to be insignificant. As such, policy prescriptions are proposed 
towards redefining the role of board members while enforcing accountability and transparency. Practical implications: This paper demonstrates 
the importance of transparency and disclosure in the managerial affairs, the financial performance of financial institutions through loan portfolio, 
liquidity and profitability increases by 0.4 with such effect being statistically relevant at 1%. Originality/value: The use of primary data in 
assessing the impact of corporate governance rather than just using secondary data forms the novelty of this study. In addition, we use principal 
component analysis (PCA) to assess the weight of various parameters.  
 
Keywords: Corporate governance, financial performance, Principal Component Analysis, Financial institutions. 
INTRODUCTION 
The wave of corporate scandals which swept across 
renowned companies in Europe and the USA (e.g. Societe 
General, the LEHMAN BROTHERS etc.), have raised 
questions as to what composition of the board can best 
monitor and control the activities of management in an 
organization. The management of these companies was 
involved in dubious, questionable and fraudulent accounting 
practices and their boards could not detect them on time. 
Fraud, mismanagement and poor monitoring of agents‟ 
activities resulted to lack of transparency and accountability 
making these top companies vulnerable to failures. This led 
to the creation of regulatory corporate governance reports 
and codes; these were introduced to set regulations that 
could ensure effective governance and to improve on the 
financial performance of these firms. Wilson (2006) noted 
that poor corporate governance can lead market to lose 
confidence in the inability of a bank to properly manage it 
assets and liability, including deposits which could in turn 
trigger a bank liquidity crisis. The strength of the corporate 
governance mechanism in a financial establishment 
determines the system‟s vulnerability to uncertainties and 
eventual risks; the reason why some institutions fail, and 
others succeed. However, Drobetz et al. (2003)‟s study 
shows that good corporate governance lead to increased 
valuation, higher profit, higher sales growth and lower 
capital expenditure. The basic building blocks of corporate 
governance structures include, Directors, Accountability and 
Audit, Directors‟ Remuneration, Shareholders and the 
AGM. Cadbury (1992), Greenbury (1995) and Hampel 
(1998) identified the need for greater transparency and 
accountability in areas such as board structure and 
operation, directors‟ contracts and the establishment of 
board monitoring committees. In addition, they all stressed 
the importance of the non-executive directors‟ monitoring 
role. Our work follows the research conducted by 
Njekangand Afuge (2017) in Camerron analysing the impact 
of CG credit unions financial performance.  
 
The interaction between good practices of CG and CSR 
disclosure, as a transparency mechanism, has not been 
extensively analysed, and neither the effect of this specific 
mechanism on financial performance has been studied in 
depth (Jain and Jamali, 2016). Baumann and Neir (2006) 
identified that higher disclosure results in higher capital 
buffers. Hirtle (2007) finds that greater disclosure produces 
lower risk and higher risk-adjusted returns. These are 
important aspects in the current banking environment post 
global financial crisis.  
Research Objectives 
The main objective of this study is to determine the effect of 
corporate governance on the financial performance of 
financial institutions. Specifically, it seeks to: 
i. Assess the effect of board role and composition on the 
financial performance of financial institutions in 
London. 
ii. Examine the role of transparency and disclosure on the 
financial performance of financial institutions. 
iii. Evaluate the effect of auditing and compliance, and risk 
management on the financial performance of financial 
institutions. 
Research Hypotheses 
This study seeks to test the null hypotheses that: 
i. H1: Board role and composition have no effect on the 
financial performance of financial institutions in 
London. 
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ii. H2: Transparency and disclosure do not affect the 
financial performance of financial institutions. 
iii. H3: Auditing and compliance have no effect on the 
financial performance of financial institutions.  
iv. H4: Risk management has no effect on the financial 
performance of financial institutions. 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Governance in banking dramatically changed in the 1990s 
because of significant changes of ownership which 
emanated from mergers and acquisitions (Arouri et al., 
2011). The recent financial crisis that affected most of the 
developed countries originated from America before 
spreading to other countries. This was because of the 
financial interconnectivities of financial institutions. The 
chief cause of the subprime mortgages that lead to the 
financial crisis was because of excessive risk taking. 
Excessive risk-taking hinges on agency problem.  Agency 
theory posits that a large board can be less efficient than a 
small board due to a rise in agency conflicts because of 
inefficient communication and cooperation costs (Jensen, 
1993). However, Pfeffer (1972) noted that board size is 
positively linked to the performance of large firms. This is 
because large firms have a greater need of more board 
members who may bring different experience and expertise 
especially when the board is well diversified.  
 
Pathan and Faff (2013) study the impact of the board size on 
the performance of US BHCs for the 1997-2011 period.  
The study indicated a negative relationship between the 
board size and performance as estimated by Tobin‟s Q, 
return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE) and pre-tax 
operating income (POI) ratios. On the contrary, when 
Adams and Mehran (2012) analysed 35 BHCs over the 
1965-1999 periods, they concluded that board size is 
positively related to bank performance as estimated by 
Tobin‟s Q and ROA ratio. 
 
A diversified board requires both executive and non-
executive directors. (Busta, 2007) analysed the influence of 
non-executive directors in decision making process. The 
results indicated that there is a positive association between 
non-executive directors and performance, in terms of return 
on invested capital and market-to-book values, for a sample 
of European banks. Moreover, Tanna et al. (2011) examined 
the impact of the board independence on the performance, 
as estimated by various efficiency measures, of seventeen 
banking institutions in the UK. They conclude that there 
exists a positive and significant relationship between the 
board independence and bank efficiency over the period 
2001-2006. On the contrary, according to the „stewardship‟ 
theory (Donaldson, 1990) there is no conflict between the 
interests of shareholders and managers. 
 
A wider study by Tandelilin et al. (2007) examined the 
correlation among corporate governance, risk management 
and bank performance using a sample of 51 Indonesian 
banks for the period 1999 – 2004. This study revealed that 
bank ownership affects both the relationship of corporate 
governance and bank performance and corporate 
governance and risk management. Risk management refers 
to the process by which an organization identifies and 
analyses threats, examines alternatives, and accepts or 
mitigates those threats even before they begins to impede 
the activities of the organization. Similarly, Culp (2008) 
opined that risk management is viewed today as one of the 
key characteristics of successful companies which enable 
firms to view all risks facing them through some form of 
pre-planned activities. Kittipat and Nopadol (2014) analysed 
the relationship between risk management system, a 
performance measurement system and the financial 
performance of Thai listed companies. The study was done 
by collecting data from persons directly involved with these 
two systems with a total of 101 respondents. The results of 
the study indicate that success of the enterprise risk 
management system and performance measurement system 
have a weak positive correlation with the financial 
performance of an organization as measured by return on 
assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE) and earnings per 
share (EPS).  
Transparency and Disclosure on financial performance: 
Transparency and disclosure of information are considered 
to be an essential element of corporate governance (Henry, 
2008). Disclosure include many aspects such as board and 
management structure disclosure, ownership structure 
disclosure and financial transparency and information 
disclosure. Zaman et al., (2014) considered voluntarily 
disclosure as one of corporate governance mechanism that 
enhances performance. Toksal (2004) noted that corporate 
governance disclosuresreduces the cost of capital. On 
contrary, Habib (2008) did not find any correlation between 
economic profit and corporate governance.Bushman and 
Smith (2001), Hassan (2012) and Fung (2014) identified a 
positive relationship of the stakeholders through CSR 
disclosure on both the decision-making processes and the 
company‟s market value, and consequently, its financial 
performance. Fuertes-Callen et, al.(2014) find the same 
positive relationship between CSR disclosure, as proxy of 
transparency, and financial performance.  
 
Sen (2011) analysed50 listed companies in order to 
determine the extent of corporate governance disclosure. He 
developed an index consisting of 67 parameters in 
accordance with the clause 49 of the listing agreement. ROE 
and ROA were used as profitability indicators. The paper 
concluded that there is a considerable scope for 
improvement in the corporate governance disclosure 
practices practiced by the firms as the difference between 
the quality and quantum of disclosures made by the 
companies was significant. It was also found that the size of 
the company is a significant determinant of corporate 
governance disclosures. Larger companies showed better 
extent of disclosure as compared to smaller ones.  
 
Kamal (2012) examined 95 UAE listed corporations to 
measure the extent of corporate governance disclosures 
made by these rms. The results found that the extent of 
disclosure in similar in almost all economic sectors 
(Industries, Banking, Insurance and Services) in UAE. The 
highest disclosure was found in management structure and 
transparency and the lowest disclosure in external auditing 
and non-audit services. The transparency and management 
structure disclosures were found significantly different 
across different sectors.  
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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY/APPROACH 
The study adopted the cross-sectional survey research 
design. This design is exploratory on the one hand and 
causal on the other because it examines the relationships 
amongst variables and the effects of the corporate 
governance indicators on financial performance.  
 
Principally, primary source of data was used with well 
structured questionnaires as the research instrument 
administered to the respondents. These respondents were 
made up of board members, committee members, staff and 
enlightened members of the financial institutions and 
corporate governance. That is, all respondents came from 
financial background. Though not a time series study, 
secondary data was collected from the annual reports of the 
financial institutions on the indicators of performance.  
 
The study population comprised of 20 financial institutions 
which were selected using the purposive sampling 
techniques in London city which are registered under the 
Ministry of Finance. From the financial institutions selected, 
a total of 10 respondents involving management (board and 
staff) and members were sampled making a total sample size 
of 10 x 20 = 200. All respondents were purposively selected 
to ensure they are from the same background and have 
experience and knowledge on corporate governance in order 
to achieve a sort of common view. We chose banks from the 
UK (in similar legislation i.e. same country) in order to limit 
the issue of heterogeneity. In other words, firms or banks in 
same country are not likely to be different from those in 
countries. That is, the cross-sectional effects are not 
significant.  
Model Specification 
The model used for this study is multiple regression analysis 
to assess the performance of the different indicators on 
corporate governance. These indicators include: Board role 
and composition (BRC), transparency and disclosure (TD), 
auditing and compliance (AC) and risk (R). Financial 
performance as the main dependent variable is denoted by 
(FP) with indicators being Profitability (P), Loan Portfolio 
(LP) and Liquidity (L) as illustrated by Njekangand  Afuge 
(2017) 
a) Profitability and Governance Equation 
This being our base model, the objective is to understand the 
need of corporate governance in enhancing performance. 
Large banks are likely to dominated by large board of 
directors compared with small banks. Large board of 
directors are likely to drawn from a diverse background 
including gender, age, experience and qualification. Whist 
small banks are likely to have a lean board of directors who 
might not diversified.  
P = f (Aα0, BRCα1, TDα2, ACα3, Rα4, eµ) linearized as: 
Profi= α0 + α1lnBRCi + α2lnTDi + α3lnACi + α4lnRi + µ                                                               
(1) 
b) Loan Portfolio and Governance Equation 
In this case, our task was to assess whether CG determines 
bank‟s loan portfolio. The idea is that strong and well 
diversified board of directors are likely to evaluate the 
banking‟s lending behaviour and determine the pattern.  
LP = f(Aβ0, BRCβ1, TDβ2, ACβ3, Rβ4, eµ).  
LPi= β0 + β1lnBRCi + β2lnTDi + β3lnACi + β4lnRi + e                                                                  
(2) 
c) Liquidity and Governance Equation 
L = f(Aλ0, BRCλ1, TDλ2, ACλ3, Rλ4, eµ) 
Li = λ0 + λ1lnBRCi + λ2lnTDi + λ3lnACi + λ4lnRi + \   (3) 
These three functions have been summarized in one function 
showing the effect of Corporate Governance on Financial 
Performance in the following Governance-Financial 
Performance function. 
 FP = f(AS0, BRCS1, TDS2, ACS3, RS4, eµ)  
Where BRC is Board role and composition, TD is 
transparency and disclosure, AC is auditing and compliance 
and R risk management in equations (1) to (3). A priori, it is 
expected that all the parameter estimates should not be zero.  
FINDINGS 
Our data is fairly distributed in terms of gender and position 
in the company. However most (52%) of our respondents 
were between 44-50 years old. The reason to ensure fairly 
distributed data was to avoid any skewness.   
 
Examining the relationship that exists amongst the different 
indicators of corporate governance in this study is 
fundamental in explaining the impact of one concept to the 
other. It is worth reiterating here that the four indicators of 
corporate governance and the three indicators of financial 
performance were used for this study. These retained 
questions are those that explain the different components of 
both corporate governance and financial performance. These 
results are presented following the PCA rankings of the 
components of corporate governance and financial 
performance as shown in table 1 below; 
Table 1: Pair-Wise Correlation (Risk Management and Transparency and Disclosure) 
Variable  RSPE     RLPB RDCC RLRF RBI TDPI TIDP 
RSPE 1.0000       
RLPB 0.5231 1.0000      
RDCC 0.6110 0.5780 1.0000     
RLRF 0.6102 0.5980 0.6003 1.0000    
RBI 0.6812 0.5901 0.6419 0.6108 1.0000   
TDPI .05092 0.4409 0.4187 0.3765 0.4107 1.0000  
TIDP 0.5987 0.5875 0.6100 0.4880 0.5401 0.6319 1.0000 
(RSPE: Regular staff performance evaluation, RLPB: Risk management, RDCC: Regular Defined Cash Ceiling RLRF: Loan recovery task force, RBI: inter-
bank reconciliation, TDPI: Transparency and declaration of personal interest, TIDP: Transparency and information disclosure policy) 
One of the diagnostic tests conducted on the variables is to 
assess the presence of multicollinearity. Multicollinearity is 
where the correlation is above 0.75. The need for staff 
performance evaluation and its relationship to the firm‟s 
performance is well documented in the literature (Kilduff et 
al., 2000; Higgs, 2005). Our results demonstrate strong 
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positive relationship between RSPE and RDCC (0.6110) 
implies that if staff is evaluated regularly and present 
credible guarantors in their files, then the risk of poor cash 
management and unauthorized withdrawals by cheque will 
reduce greatly, thus improving on cash management. 
Equally, if the staff are trained and evaluated regularly 
(RSPE), inter branch reconciliation will be optimized (RBI), 
thus minimizing fraud and errors that may arise. This 
explains the strong positive relationship between RSPE and 
RBI. The explanation goes same for all the values presented 
amongst the different relationships in the table 1 above. This 
strong positive relationship is an indication that risk 
management is a fundamental indicator of corporate 
governance that influences financial performance. 
Table 2: Pair-Wise Correlation (Transparency and Disclosure, Auditing and Compliance and Board Role and Composition) 
Variable TMUR     TAAP AABC AMR AIEB BIR BMG 
TMUR 1.0000       
TAAP 0.5008 1.0000      
AABC 0.2109 0.2613 1.0000     
AMR 0.5109 0.5366 0.1413 1.0000    
AIEB 0.5041 0.5003 0.2418 0.6100 1.0000   
BIR 0.1813 0.1006 0.2100 0.1690 0.1413 1.0000  
BMG 0.3200 0.3711 0.2001 0.3210 0.3910 0.1519 1.0000 
(TMUR: Timely up to date report, TAAP: Asset acquisition procedures, AABC: Audit on activities of board and committee, AMR: Audit monthly report, AIEB: 
Auditing, internal and external by-laws, BIR: Board interpretation of reports, BMG: Board mastery of guidelines) 
Table 2 presents the relationships that exist amongst the 
variables of the three different components cited above. It is 
worth noting that following PCA components rankings, the 
strength of the relationship decreases as we move from one 
component to the other. The strength of the relationship for 
instance has dropped as we move from risk management to 
transparency and disclosure. The relationship between 
TMUR and TAAP is a strong positive relationship (0.5008) 
implying that regular reporting is required (TMUR) for the 
members to closely monitor the procedure and quality of 
assets acquired (TAAP). There is also a strong positive 
relationship (0.5109) between the regular presentation of 
financial reports (TMUR) and the ability to interpret these 
reports by the auditors (AMR), otherwise these reports will 
not make any useful contributions to the union's 
performance. According to the results, reporting (TMUR) is 
worthless if there is no regular monitoring by the auditors to 
compare reports with actual results from the field. This 
explains the strong positive relationship (0.5041) between 
(TMUR) and (AIEB). Moreover, the presentation of 
monthly reports and regular monitoring by the auditors 
(AMR and AIEB) are strongly correlated to the evaluation 
of the value and quality of assets acquired (TAAP). This 
implies that without regular monitoring and reporting, poor 
quality assets could be acquired at exorbitant prices with the 
aim of meeting self-interests.  Above all, regular monitoring 
(AMR) without regular reporting is worthless. This is 
confirmed by the strong positive relationship that links 
monitoring with reporting. 
Table 3: Pair-Wise Correlation (Board Role and Composition) 
Variable BCSF BMR BEMS 
BCSF 1.0000   
BMR 0.2901 1.0000  
BEMS 0.5613 0.2978 1.0000 
(BCSF: Board committee, and staff functions, BMR: Board mastery of 
reports, BEMS: Board evaluation of management staff) 
Table 3 reveals that there exists a positive relationship 
between separation of functions (BCSF) and board mastery 
of reports and staff evaluation (BMR and BEMS). Staff 
evaluation can easily be captured from the report of 
activities carried out by the staff. This conforms to the 
positive relationship between BMR and BEMS.  
Techniques of Estimation: 
This study will make use of the multiple regression analysis 
technique assuming that the institutions could have some 
differences which might not be time variant. The effect of 
corporate governance on the financial performance of 
financial institutions in London will be captured by 
examining the effects of the various indicators of corporate 
governance on the dependent variable.  
 
The Principal Component Analysis (PCA) will then be 
conducted on these questions to examine which questions 
better captures the various indicators. PCA is a variable 
reduction procedure. It is used when we obtain data from a 
large number of variables (questions) and believe that there 
is redundancy in the variables (questions). Redundancy 
means that some of the variables are correlated with one 
another possibly because they are measuring the same 
construct. In performing a PCA, scores will be calculated for 
each subject or indicator. The scores from the questions will 
then be weighted optimally and summed to compute the 
scores on a given component or variable. 
The Principal component Analysis (PCA) results: 
Table 4 below shows the four components and their 
respective eigen values and proportion of the total variance 
that have been retained as principals.  
Table 4: Retained Components for Governance Indicators and their 
Eigen values 
Component  Eigenvalue Proportion 
(%) 
Cumulative 
Proportion (%) 
Component 1 9.9130 20.01 27.10 
Component 2 4.5127 9.41 36.51 
Component 3 2.1802 7.45 43.96 
Component 4 2.1007 3.92 47.88 
Component 1 is risk management, components 2is transparency and 
disclosure, component 3 is on auditing and compliance and component 4 is 
board role and composition. 
Table 4 above shows that risk management accounts for 
20.01% of the total variance, transparency and disclosure 
accounts for 9.41, auditing and compliance for 7.45% and 
board role and composition  about 3.92% of the total 
variance.  We then move to the next step where we arrange 
the factor in a hierarchical as shown in table 5 below. 
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Table 5: Loadings (Eigenvectors) of Retained Components of Governance Measures 
Component 1 is risk management, components 2 is transparency and disclosure, component 3 is on auditing and compliance and component 4 is board role and 
composition. 
Component 1 Component 2 Component 3 Component 4 
Variable Eigen 
Vector 
Variable Eigen-
vector 
Variable Eigen-
vector 
Variable Eigen-vector 
RSPE 0.4912 TDPI -0.5129 AABC 0.3196 BIR 0.1920 
RLPB 0.5219 TIDP -0.5120 AMR -0.2932 BMG 0.5619 
RDCC 0.4871 TMUR -0.5194 AIEB -0.3100 BCSF 0.4331 
RLRF 0.5912 TAAP -0.4100 - - BMR 0.5611 
RBI 0.5129 - - - - BEMS 0.4190 
(RSPE: Regular staff performance evaluation, RLPB: Risk management , RDCC: Regular Defined Cash Ceiling, RLRF: Loan recovery task force, RBI: inter-
bank reconciliation, TDPI: Transparency and declaration of personal interest, TIDP: Transparency and information disclosure policy, TMUR: Timely up to date 
report, TAAP: Asset acquisition procedures, AABC: Audit on activities of board and committee, AMR: Audit monthly report, AIEB: Auditing internal and 
external by-laws, BIR: Board interpretation of reports, BMG: Board mastery of guidelines, BCSF: Board committee, and staff functions, BMR: Board mastery of 
reports, BEMS: Board evaluation of management staff) 
 
In this we assess the board of directors from a number of 
fronts. That is, the need for the directors to declare their 
interests (TDPI), information disclosure (TIDP), availability 
of monthly reports (TMUR) and procedures that evaluate 
the quality and value of assets (TAAP). This is in order to 
analyse the impact of transparency and disclosure.  As part 
of CG requirements, it is very important that the board of 
directors disclose material interest in any 
undertaking.Disclosing information about a corporation‟s 
governance is also important to potential investors and 
shareholders and a critical component of transparency. 
 
On their part, the non-interference of the board in the 
presentation of audit reports (AABC), the actual monthly 
presentation of audit accounts (AMR) and the plan of 
auditing (AIEB) are on their part elements of auditing and 
compliance that load heavily in component 3. The 
importance of compliance has been identified by Tariq and 
Abbas (2013) who noted that there is a positive association 
between compliance and firm performance.  
 
Compliance with the regulatory requirements will entail a 
detailed interpretation of regulatory framework and 
reports.The ability of board and committee members to 
interpret reports (BIR), mastery of guidelines of supervising 
management activities (BMG), functions clarity and non-
interference of board (BCSF), the availability of reports 
priori to board meetings (BMR) and the existence of 
performance evaluation for staff and management 
succession (BEMS) are the key ingredients of board role and 
composition. 
PCA on Performance: 
The number of components retained for subsequent analysis 
is subject to attaining Kaiser Criterion that only components 
with eigen value greater than 1 are retained. The PCA 
results show that up to five components are capable of being 
retained. However, the first three components have high 
eigen values and capture more variables of interest than the 
last two. As such, only the first three components are 
extracted with the relative proportion of variance accounted 
for displayed on table 6 below. 
Table 6: Retained Components for Performance measures and their 
Eigenvalues 
Component  Eigen 
value 
Proportion 
(%) 
Cumulative 
Proportion (%) 
Component 1 9.2331 50.12 50.12 
Component 2 4.009 10.11 60.23 
Component 3 2.1900 7.10 67.33 
 
The eigenvalues indicate that component 1 accounts for 
50.12% of the total variation in performance of financial 
institutions, component 2 accounts for 10.11% while 
component 3 accounts for 7.10% of that variation.  
Cumulatively, these three components jointly account for 
67.33% of the variation in the performance of financial 
institutions in London.  
Table 7: Loadings (Eigenvectors) of Retained Components of Performance Measures 
Component 1 is loan portfolios , component 2 is liquidity  and component 3 is profitability 
Component 1 Component 2 Component 3 
Variable Eigenvector Variable Eigenvector Variable Eigenvector 
LPCR 0.3910 LDAD 0.5104 PICR 0.3916 
LPFC 0.4100 LRAD 0.3012 PMSO -0.4103 
LPLP 0.3901 LMDP 0.4012 PRSM -0.4108 
LPLR 0.4108 LUIA -0.1004 PCSF 0.3912 
LPDL 0.4375 - - PDOI -0.4957 
LPLD 0.5612 - - - - 
LPWO 0.5781 - - - - 
(LPCR: Loan portfolio, interest collection rate, LPFC: Loan portfolio, fake collateral, 
LPLP: Loan portfolio, quality of loan policy, LPLR: Loan portfolio, low cost of loan recovery, LPDL: Loan portfolio, delinquency of loan, LPWO: Loan 
portfolio, written-off LDAD: Liquidity, demand deposits) 
The eigen values for each of the components reveal that the 
variability in the performance of financial institutions is 
determined in order of merit (as indicated by eigen values) 
by the loan portfolio policy, liquidity policy and the 
profitability aim of the institutions.  
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Going by their eigen vectors, it can be observed that the 
interest collection rates  (LPCR),  non-existence of fake 
collateral documents in bank‟s loan files (LPFC), an up-to-
date loan policy for recovery of bad debts (LPLP), the low 
cost of loan recovery for the bank (LPLR), low rate of loan 
delinquency (LPDL), decreasing rate of loan delinquency 
(LPLD) and the writing off of loans above a year old 
(LPWO) exert much influence on loan portfolio 
management index; the availability of deposits on demand 
(LDAD), bank reserve availability (LRAD), ease of meeting 
cash demands (LMDP) and the existence of an investment 
account for saving excess liquidity (LUIA) are the major 
determinants of liquidity preferences while prompt payment 
of interest (PICR), meeting social obligations (PMSO), 
meeting reserve requirement is as a result of profitability 
(PRSM), cheap sources of funding relative to interest 
generated (PCSF) and the increasing rate of dividends paid 
(PDOI) are the major factors accounting for the variability 
in the profitability of financial institutions in London.  
Table 8: The results of the multiple regression analysis results are presented in the table below 
 Loan Portfolio Liquidity Profitability Financial Performance 
Coefficient 
(LSE) 
Coefficient 
(LSE) 
Coefficient 
(LSE) 
Coefficient 
(LSE) 
BRC 0.3460 *** 
(0.2001) 
0.1923 
(0.0930) 
0.7100** 
(0.2190) 
0.1730 
(0.1331) 
TD 0.1091 *** 
(0.1003) 
0.8710*** 
(0.0751) 
0.1410 
(0.1010) 
0.3046*** 
(0.4100) 
AC 0.2902 ** 
(0.0160) 
0.9120*** 
(0.0071) 
0.1296 
(0.8230) 
0.3309** 
(0.0031) 
RM 0.2953*** 
(0.1200) 
0.89518** 
(0.1740) 
0.1290** 
(0.1201) 
0.6230 *** 
(0.1006) 
_CONS 0.2975 
(0.1007) 
0.1096* 
(0.2306) 
0.1201 
(0.036) 
0.7100 
(0.3001) 
R-squared 0.8001 0.4230 0.6701 0.6950 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.7812 0.4035 0.6396 0.6899 
Fstat 65.90 30.12 56.09 60.79 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
The results indicate, board role and composition, 
transparency and disclosure, auditing and compliance as 
well as risk management within financial institutions in 
London governance indicators that significantly influence 
the financial performance of the financial institutions as 
indicated by their test statistical values, magnitude and 
signs. Therefore, we reject the stated null hypotheses except 
for the role and composition of board members which is 
insignificant.  
 
The regression results on column five of table 8 above show 
that transparency and disclosure has a positive and 
significant effect on the financial performance of financial 
institutions in London. In fact, as the level of transparency 
and disclosure in the managerial affairs increases, the 
financial performance of financial institutions through loan 
portfolio, liquidity and profitability increases by 0.3046 with 
such effect being statistically relevant at 1%.  
 
Similar implications can be drawn from the sign and 
magnitude of the coefficient of auditing and compliance. Its 
magnitude and sign show that as the level of auditing of 
accounts in financial institutions and compliance with 
banking regulations increases, the financial performance of 
these institutions has the propensity of increasing by 0.3309. 
This effect is found to be statistically significant at 5% level 
of significance, is in line with backing a priori expectations. 
On its part, the coefficient of risk management is positive 
and significant at 1%. Precisely, as the level of risk 
mitigation and management increases amongst financial 
institutions, there is a tendency for financial performance to 
significantly increase by 0.6230 the effect of which is 
significant at 1% level of significance, through the effect on 
loan portfolio, liquidity decisions and profitability.  
 
The results on column five of table 8 further indicate that the 
joint variation in board role and composition, transparency 
and disclosure of accounts, auditing and compliance with 
banking regulations and risk management account for 
approximately 69% of the total variation in the performance 
of financial institutions in London city. Approximately 31% 
of the overall financial performance of these financial 
institutions is, therefore, accounted for by the error term that 
is, other factors not modelled in the financial performance 
model such as membership and other specific characteristics 
of the financial institutions.  This assertion and the 
prescriptive power of the effect of this joint is ascertained 
plausible by the significance level of the Fisher F-ratio 
whose probability shows a 99% confidence in predictions 
made based on such results. 
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1 Appendixes 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
Section A: General Information: 
1)  Position in the financial institution:  a) Member        b) Committee         c) Board            d) Staff 
2)  Sex: a) Male                b) Female                c).      Others 
3)  Age:a) 20 – 25        b) 26 – 31        c) 32 – 37         d) 38 – 43         e) 44 – 50 .         f) 50+  
Section B: Corporate Governance Issues: 
Instructions: Each question has five options and you are expected to mark a tick (  ) in the box that corresponds to the best 
response. 
SA=Strongly Agree, A=Agree, I=Indifferent, D=Disagree, SD=Strongly Disagree 
No 1. Board Role and Composition SA A I D SD 
1. Board members have a series of reports that must be available before a 
board meeting holds.  
     
2. Board has a performance evaluation technique and management 
succession plan for the staff. 
     
3. Board and committee members are capable of interpreting all financial 
reports from staff. 
     
 2. Transparency and Disclosure SA A I D SD 
1.  Regular monthly and up to standard reports are made available to 
members. 
     
2.  The supervisory board reports its activities directly to the members; no 
board interference. 
     
3.  All financial reports are true and fare, no hidden or modified accounts.      
4.  There is a project committee which ensures all projects fall within 
objectives and budget of the union. 
     
 
No 3. Auditing and Compliance SA A I D SD 
1. There is an independent audit committee (internal and external) that sits 
monthly.  
     
2. The audit process meets the standards put in place by the Ministry of 
Finance and the software has an audit trail. 
     
3. There is an internal policy guiding the activities and reporting channels of 
the internal controller. 
     
4. There is a reputable external supervisory body which presents monthly 
reports about the union. 
     
5. Monthly audit reports are presented by the internal and external auditors.       
 
No 4. Risk Management SA A I D SD 
1.  The financial institution has an up to date risk management policy.       
2.  There is a loan recovery task force with a detailed loan recovery 
schedule and procedure.  
     
3. There is a defined cash ceiling and signatories to bank account sign just 
one cheque leaf at a time. 
     
4. All staff files have performance evaluation, guarantor and observation 
forms which are updated regularly. 
     
5. The financial institutions have access to all members quoted in the 
blacklist of all supervisory bodies. 
     
6. All collaterals (landed property) are verified monthly at the level of the 
lands office. 
     
7. All loan files are accompanied by business plans in the case of business 
loans or a detailed project. 
     
Section C: Financial Performance Indicators: 
No  1.    Profitability SA A I D SD 
1. Dividends paid in the union are on the increase (Latest dividends paid 
fall between 5% to 7%). 
     
2. Service cost (loan interest, transfer and deposit charges) is reduced 
thanks to high profits. 
     
3. All the reserve requirements (education, building, risk management) are 
met thanks to the profit level. 
     
4. The institution is capable of recruiting and paying qualified personnel.      
5. The financial institution meets all its social obligations through the 
profits made. 
     
6. The profit of the financial institution is on a steady increase reflected by 
the reduction in transaction cost. 
     
7. The sources of funds are relatively cheaper compared to the interest 
generated from loans. 
     
8. Loan interest is paid on time and the actual is always equal to or above 
the expected amounts. 
     
Isaiah Oino, et al, Journal of Business Management and Economics, 6 (08), August, 2018 
9 
9. Profits are on the increase thanks to income generating assets like 
buildings. 
     
10. All bills, payables, remunerations and others are paid on time.       
No 2.    Liquidity SA A I D SD 
1. All members' deposits are available on demand and timely.       
2. There is a bank reserve account to meet prompt credit demands and 
savings withdrawals. 
     
3. The institution targets and meets cash demands at peak periods without 
stress. 
     
4. The institution lends out up to only 70% of her savings while the rest 
and shares are kept as reserves in the union's reserve accounts. 
     
5. There is a cash ceiling (maximum safe amount) in all the union's 
branches. 
     
6. There is a day-to-day liquidity follow up to ensure that liquidity and 
profitability are at equilibrium. 
     
7. There is an investment account different from bank current accounts in 
which excess liquidity is deposited. 
     
8. When demands for loans increase, investments in landed property are 
stopped till when there is excess liquidity in the union. 
     
9. The institution ventures in external funding (loans and term deposits) 
only when loan demand is more than 70% savings. 
     
10. There is an investment committee which puts all excess liquidity into 
profitable ventures. 
     
No 3. Loan Portfolio SA A I D SD 
1. The number of delinquent loans and their amounts in the institution are 
on a decrease over time. 
     
2. The loan interest collection rate in the institution is at least 90% or 
more. 
     
3. There is an up to date loan policy which has considerably reduced bad 
debts. 
     
4. The cost of loan recovery is far lower than the benefits from the loan.      
5. The loan delinquency rate falls below the 5% regulation rate.      
6. The loan recovery team has been very successful in collecting 
delinquent loans. 
     
7. All delinquent loans above 1year are written off from the balance sheet.      
8. All loan application files have duly registered mortgages.      
9. All board, committee and staff loans are always current; no 
delinquency. 
     
10. There are no fake collateral documents in the institution‟s loan files.      
SECTION D: Ranking Financial Performance Indicators: 
Rank the following in order of importance in your financial institution by marking a tick  
(   ) on the appropriate answer 
 
NO.  Indicators 1st 2nd 3rd 
1.  Profitability    
2.  Liquidity    
3.  Loan portfolio    
 
